Cryptographic schemes based on the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem have several very desirable aspects: Low computational overhead, simple implementation and conjectured post-quantum hardness. Choosing the LPN noise parameter sufficiently low allows for public key cryptography. In this work, we construct the first standard model public key encryption scheme with key dependent message security based solely on the low noise LPN problem. Additionally, we establish a new connection between LPN with a bounded number of samples and LPN with an unbounded number of samples. In essence, we show that if LPN with a small error and a small number of samples is hard, then LPN with a slightly larger error and an unbounded number of samples is also hard. The key technical ingredient to establish both results is a variant of the LPN problem called the extended LPN problem.
Introduction
The LPN Problem The learning parity with noise (LPN) problem asks to find a secret binary vector s ∈ F n 2 given noisy linear samples of the form (a, a, s + e) ∈ F n 2 × F 2 where a is chosen uniformly at random and e is an additive noise term that occurs with probability ρ. Due to its simplicity and binary arithmetic, the LPN problem has become a central hub in secret key cryptography [13, 30, 32, 29, 35] . These applications use the high noise LPN problem where the noise rate ρ < 1/2 is a constant. In the low noise LPN problem, the noise rate ρ tends asymptotically to 0. Alekhnovich [6] provided a construction of a public key encryption scheme based on LPN for noise rates ρ = O(1/ √ n). Recently, more complex cryptographic primitives have been constructed from low noise LPN such as chosen ciphertext secure public key encryption [21, 33] and composable oblivious transfer [18] . In the original formulation of the LPN problem, the search algorithm/adversary may demand an unbounded number of samples whereas the bounded
Extended LPN
The central tool we use in our constructions is a version of the LPN problem called extended decisional LPN problem, or eDLPN in short. The eDLPN problem can be seen as a special case for q = 2 of the extended LWE problem introduced O'Neill, Peikert and Waters [37] and proven hard under standard LWE by Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [7] . The binary version we use in this work was first discussed by Kiltz, Masny and Pietrzak [33] .
In the eDLPN problem, the adversary's goal is to distinguish (A, RA, e, Re) from (A, U, e, Re), where A is a randomly chosen matrix, R is a randomly chosen low weight matrix, U is a randomly chosen matrix and e follows some distribution χ. This is similar to the dual formulation of the decisional LPN problem, where the adversary has to distinguish (A, RA) from (A, U). However, in the extended decisional LPN problem, the adversary obtains an extra advice Re about a secret matrix R, where the vector e can have any distribution. Kiltz, Masny and Pietrzak [33] observed that in the LPN case, this advice can be extremely useful to enable reductions to simulate faithfully. In particular, the eDLPN problem can effectively be used as a computational substitute for the (generalized) leftover hash lemma [31, 19] or gaussian regularity lemmata for lattices [26] .
In Section 3, we provide a generalization of the extended LPN problem we call leaky LPN ( -LPN), which may be of independent interest. In the -LPN problem, the advice given to the adversary can be described by an arbitrary adversarially chosen leakage function γ from a family L and is not limited to linear functions as in the extended LPN problem. Clearly, the hardness of the extended LPN problem follows immediately from the hardness of the leaky LPN problem when instantiating the leakage functions with linear functions. If the functions in L output short strings, say strings of at most logarithmic length, then the hardness of the -LPN search problem follows immediately from the standard LPN problem, since all possible leakage values can be efficiently enumerated (or guessed). The situation is slightly different for decisional problems. In general, decisional problems become easy if even a single bit of arbitrary leakage is allowed. However, we only allow the leakage to depend on R and in particular not on A. We show that a sample preserving search to decision reduction of Applebaum et al. [11] is in fact leakage preserving. We can thus base the hardness of the decisional problem -DLPN on -LPN, and therefore on LPN given that the functions in L only provide short advice.
KDM Secure Public Key Encryption
We will now provide an overview of our construction of a KDM secure public key encryption scheme from LPN. The construction is inspired by the public key encryption scheme of Applebaum et al. [10] , which however lives in the LWE realm. The basic idea, as in [10] , is to make encryptions of the secret key syntactically similar to the public key. More specifically, public keys in our scheme will be of the form (A, y = As + e) where s is the secret key. It follows immediately from the decisional LPN problem that the public key is pseudorandom. Encryption takes a message m and computes
where the matrix R is chosen from a low weight distribution and G is the generator matrix of a good, efficiently decodable binary linear code. We remark that while this scheme bears strong resemblances with (and is inspired by) the LWE based scheme of [10] , it is rather incomparable to the (high noise) LPN based private key encryption schemes of [10, 9] or previous low-noise LPN public key encryption schemes [6, 21, 33] . Notice that standard IND-CPA security of this scheme follows directly from the fact that y is pseudorandom and thus also (RA, Ry) is pseudorandom given the public key (A, y), by using the dual formulation of the decisional LPN problem (i.e. (A , RA ) ≈ c (A , U)). To decrypt a ciphertext c = (C 1 , c 2 ), we basically compute z = c 2 − C 1 s and recover m from z by using the efficient decoding algorithm for the code generated by G. Correctness of the scheme follows from the fact that
Since we have chosen R and e from low noise distributions, the term Re has low weight with high probability. Thus it follows that a decoder of the code generated by G will be able to recover m from z. We will briefly sketch how to establish 1-circular security of this scheme, where the adversary gets a single encryption of the secret key (or an encryption of 0). For the full proof of KDM security for affine functions, refer to Section 4. An encryption of the secret key has the form (RA, Ry + Gs). Figure 1 provides the game transform for this security reduction.
The first three steps shown in Figure 1 do not change the real experiment but basically rewrite the challenge ciphertext. From step 3 to step 4 we replace the matrix RA by a uniformly random matrix U. Since we also need the additional term Re to provide the correct distribution to the adversary, we will use the extended decisional LPN problem to show that these two experiments are Game public key challenge ciphertext remark 1.
Real (A, y = As + e) (RA, Ry + Gs) 2.
Real (A, As + e) (RA, R(As + e) + Gs) identical 3.
Real (A, As + e) (RA, (RA + G)s + Re) identical 4.
H 2 (A, As + e) (RA − G, R(As + e)) identical 8.
The Game Transform for KDM-CPA security computationally indistinguishable. In particular, we use A and e provided by the eDLPN problem to construct a public key, while we use RA and the advice Re to construct the encryption of the secret key. Then, we replace RA by a random matrix U, which yields an indistinguishable experiment by the hardness of eDLPN.
Step 4 to 5 is another bridging step which does not change the experiment. Since U is distributed uniformly random, so is the matrix U = U + G. Thus, instead of choosing U uniformly at random we can choose U uniformly at random and set U = U − G. From step 5 to step 6 we replace the matrix U by RA. Again, we have to use the extended decisional LPN problem as we need the extra advice Re. It now becomes clear that we have used steps 3 to 6 to pull the matrix G from the second component of the challenge ciphertext to its first component, i.e. we have transformed (RA, (RA+G)s+Re) into (RA−G, RAs+Re).
Step 6 to step 7 is another basic bridging step. From step 7 to step 8 we replace the second component As+e of the public key by a randomly chosen u, indistinguishability follows from the standard decisional LPN problem. From step 8 to step 9 we replace (A, RA, u, Ru) by (A, U, u, u ) for uniformly random U and u , indistinguishability follows from the dual formulation of the decisional LPN problem. Finally, from step 9 to step 10, we replace U − G by U. We can do this since the uniform distribution U is invariant under an additive shift by a constant matrix G. Thus, in the last experiment the challenge ciphertext is just uniformly random, which concludes this outline.
Unbounded Samples LPN from Bounded Samples LPN
In the following we will distinguish between bounded and unbounded samples LPN. We will denote search LPN with a secret of length n, m samples and noise rate ρ by LPN(n, m, ρ) and decisional LPN with a secret of length n, unbounded samples and noise rate ρ by DLPN(n, ρ ). Our second contribution is a hardness reduction which bases the hardness of DLPN(n, ρ ) on LPN(n, 2n, ρ).
More specifically, we show that if LPN(n, 2n, ρ) is hard, then DLPN(n, ρ ) is also hard, where
For the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, there exists a statistical random self reduction [26, 10] . The idea of this reduction is to use m ≈ n log(q) seed samples to generate arbitrarily many fresh samples. The noise rate in the new samples increases only slightly. Specifically, if (A, y = As + z) is such a given set of seed samples, then one can generate new samples by drawing e ∈ Z m q from a discrete gaussian [5, 36] and setting a = A e and y = e y. Now it holds y = e y = e As + e z = a s + e, z .
The pair (a , y + e ), where e is a gaussian smoothing term, is a proper LWE sample, as a = e A can be shown to be statistically close to uniform and e, z follows an independent discrete gaussian distribution even conditioned on a = e A 1 . Such an approach, however, cannot be directly transferred to the LPN setting. For the vector a = A e to be statistically close to uniform, e must have min-entropy ≈ n, and thus high weight. But this in turn means that e, z will only have a negligibly small bias. We remark that such a high noise sample amplification was used Lyubashevsky [34] to cryptanalize LPN in sub-exponential time, but this technique does not seem to be applicable in the context of an efficient (i.e. PPT) hardness reduction, especially when the number of samples is at most polynomial.
Therefore, in our reduction we will replace the statistical tools in the above reduction by a computational technique based on the eDLPN problem. Again, we start with a given amount of m = 2n seed samples and generate new samples from these. While we cannot hope that the samples we generate in this way have the proper distribution (in the statistical sense), we will be able to show that the distribution generated in this way is computationally indistinguishable from the real LPN distribution. More specifically, let (A, y) be the LPN seed samples. We will compute new samples by choosing a random low weight r and setting a = A r and y = r y = r, y . Now, assume first that y = As + e. Then it holds that y = r As + r, e = a, s + r, e .
While (a, y ) syntactically looks like an LPN sample, it is statistically far away from a correctly distributed sample. There are two issues. First, a = r A is not distributed uniformly. Second, the noise term r, e is correlated with a. The first issue alone could be resolved by assuming the hardness of the DLPN. To deal with both issues simultaneously, we will resort to the eDLPN problem, which allows us to present a noise term r, e with the right distribution. More specifically, the eDLPN problem allows us to replace a = r A by a uniformly random a but also provides us with an advice (e, r, e ) that allows us to simulate the noise term r, e correctly. On the other hand, if y was chosen uniformly at random, then the pseudorandomness of (a, y ) = (r A, r y) follows easily from the dual formulation of the LPN problem DLPN. Since we can base the hardness of all auxiliary problems on LPN(n, 2n, ρ), it follows that DLPN(n, ρ ) is at least as hard as LPN(n, 2n, ρ). This concludes this outline.
Preliminaries
In the following, let λ always denote the security parameter. We call a machine PPT if it runs in probabilistic (expected) polynomial time. For a search problem P and an adversary/search algorithm A let Adv P (A) denote the probability of A finding a solution of a random instance of P. For a decisional problem D which consists in distinguishing two distributions X and Y and a distinguishing algorithm
When we don't write it explicitly, we will implicitly assume that search algorithms and distinguishers get 1 λ as an additional input. We will denote the Hamming weight of a vector x ∈ F n 2 by x 0 = |{i :
, we define the Hamming weight of M by M 0 = max i m i 0 where the m i are the column vectors of M. It follows easily for all M ∈ F m×n 2 and x ∈ F n 2 that Mx 0 ≤ M 0 · x 0 . We need asymptotically good, efficiently decodable binary linear codes for the construction of our KDM secure public key encryption scheme. A binary linear [k, n] code C is a n dimensional subspace of F k 2 . We call G ∈ F k×n 2 a generator matrix of C if every c ∈ C can be written as c = Gx for some x ∈ F n 2 . We assume codes C come with efficient encoding and decoding procedures C.Encode and C.Decode, where C.Encode(x) = G · x for some generator matrix G of C. An error correcting code can efficiently correct an α fraction of errors, if for every e ∈ F k 2 with e 0 ≤ αk, it holds that C.Decode(C.Encode(x) + e) = x. There exists a large corpus of literature of linear codes that can efficiently correct a constant fraction of errors, for instance concatenated codes [25] or expander codes [40, 41] .
Corollary 2. Let A be a PPT adversary that breaks LPN(n, m, S(m, ρ)) with advantage . Then there exists a PPT adversary A that breaks LPN(n, m, ρ) with advantage
. Moreover, if there exists a PPT distinguisher D that distinguishes DLPN(n, m, S(m, ρ)) with advantage , then there exists a PPT adversary A that breaks LPN(n, m, ρ) with advantage
Proof. We show that if (A, As + e) is an instance of LPN(n, m, ρ), then with high probability (A, As + e) is also an instance of LPN(n, m, S(m, ρ)). Since both problems are search problems, a solution can easily be verified. First note that we can safely assume that ρ = ω(1/n), as for ρ = O(1/n) LPN(n, m, ρ) is trivially easy. As ρ = ω(1/n), an error vector e ← $ Ber(m, ρ) has weight ρm with probability
by the deMoivre-Laplace binomial point mass limit theorem (see e.g. [24] ). Moreover, conditioned to e 0 = ρm it holds that e follows exactly the distribution S(m, ρ). The hardness of the decisional problem follows by Lemma 1.
As a convenient reformulation of the LPN problem, we define the decisional dual LPN problem.
and u ← $ F k 2 . The goal of the DDLPN(n, m, k, ρ) problem is to distinguish the distributions (A, RA, a, Ra) and (A, U, a, u).
The hardness of DDLPN(n, m, k, ρ) follows from DLPN(n, m, ρ) (see e.g. [10] or [21] ) using the fact that for a randomly chosen matrix A we can also sample a random H such that it holds H · A = 0 and H is uniformly random (not given A). Following Kiltz et al. [33] and Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [7] , we provide a definition of the extended LPN problem. We only define the extended LPN problem for Bernoulli error distributions.
and e ← $ χ. The goal of the eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, χ) problem is to distinguish the distributions (A, RA, e, Re) and (A, U, e, Re).
In Section 3 we will establish the hardness of eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, χ) from LPN(n, m, ρ).
Key Dependent Message Secure Public Key Encryption
Syntactically, a public key encryption scheme PKE consists of three PPT algorithms PKE.KeyGen, PKE.Enc and PKE.Dec, such that PKE.KeyGen generates a pair (pk, sk) of public and secret keys, PKE.Enc takes a public key pk and a plaintext m and outputs a ciphertext c and PKE.Dec takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext c and outputs a plaintext m. We say that PKE is correct, if it holds for all plaintexts m (of size corresponding to λ) that if (pk, sk) ← PKE.KeyGen(1 λ ), then PKE.Dec(sk, PKE.Enc(pk, m)) = m, except with negligible probability over the randomness used by PKE.KeyGen, PKE.Enc and PKE.Dec.
The security notion we consider in this work is key dependent message security under chosen plaintext attacks. In the security experiment corresponding to this notion, the adversary gets a list of public keys {pk i } and access to an oracle that computes encryptions of functions of the secret keys. We call such dependencies key cycles, even though the functional relationships the adversary obtains can be more complex than key cycles.
Definition 4.
We say a public key encryption-scheme PKE is ciphertext indistinguishable under key dependent message chosen plaintext attacks (KDM-CPA) for cycles of length l with respect to a class F of functions mapping l secret keys to a plaintext, if every PPT-adversary A has success-probability at most negligibly better than 1/2 in the experiment
Remark 4. We implicitly assume that sanity checks are performed by the oracle, i.e. it only accepts KDM queries with f ∈ F and j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Moreover, we assume that the KDM oracle may have access to all local variables of the experiment KDM-CPA, in particular the pk i and sk i and the bit b.
Applebaum [8] provides a general transfomation which transforms any public key encryption scheme with KDM security against affine functions into a public key encryption scheme with KDM security against arbitrary functions with circuits of bounded size. Thus, it is sufficient to construct a public key encryption scheme with KDM security against affine functions to obtain a scheme with security against the more general class of functions.
Leaky LPN
Kiltz, Masny and Pietrzak [33] , following Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [7] , suggested to use the extended LPN problem for cryptographic constructions. We will provide a generalization of the extended LPN problem which we call leaky LPN. While in the extended LPN problem the adversary obtains some linear auxiliary information about the LPN error term e, the leaky LPN problem allows this auxiliary information to be modeled by a general leakage function.
be chosen uniformly at random, let s ← $ F n 2 be chosen uniformly at random and let e ← $ χ.
1. The problem -LPN(n, m, χ, L) is to find s, given (A, As + e, γ(e)) for an arbitrary γ ∈ L.
2. The problem -DLPN(n.m, χ, L) is to distinguish the distributions (A, As + e, γ(e)) and (A, u, γ(e)) for an arbitrary γ ∈ L.
We can think of -LPN and -DLPN as games between an adversary/distinguisher and an experiment in the following way. First the adversary specifies an γ ∈ L of its choice to the experiment and then receives (A, y, z). Now the adversary either has to guess a solution or distinguish (depending on whether he is playing against -LPN or -DLPN).
We observe that the search-to-decision reduction of Applebaum et al. [11] can be easily adapted to the case of leaky LPN. This yields that -LPN and -DLPN are in fact equivalent. Proof. Assume towards contradiction that there exists a PPT-algorithm D and an γ ∈ L such that D distinguishes (A, As + e, γ(e)) and (A, u, γ(e)) with non-negligible advantage . Thus assume that
We will construct an algorithm A that computes the Goldreich-Levin hardcore-bit r, s of s, given (A, As + e, γ(e)) with advantage /2. By the Goldreich Levin theorem [28, 27] 2 this algorithm A can be used to construct a PPT algorithm A that solves the leaky LPN search problem with advantage
A is given as follows.
We will now analyze the success probability of A . Let (A, As + e, γ(e)) and r be A 's input. First notice that since A is distributed uniformly at random, so is B = A − ur , as the uniform distribution is shift invariant. Moreover, since A = B + u · r , it holds that y = As + e = Bs + ur s + e = Bs + u r, s + e. On one hand, if r, s = 0, then (B, y, z) has the distribution (B, Bs + e, γ(e)). On the other hand, if r, s = 1, then y = Bs + e + u. As u is uniformly distributed (independently of B, s and e), y is also uniformly distributed. Thus, (B, y, z) has the distribution (B, u , γ(e)), for uniformly chosen u . We conclude that
i.e. A computes the Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit r, s with advantage 2 . Thus, by the GoldreichLevin theorem there exists a PPT adversary that breaks -LPN(n, m, χ, L) with advantage 2 /8.
We will now establish hardness of eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, χ) from LPN(n, m, ρ) using leaky LPN.
Lemma 6. Let m ≥ 2n. Then for any distribution χ on F m 2 and any k = poly(λ) it holds that if there exists a PPT distinguisher D that distinguishes eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, χ) with advantage , then there exists a PPT adversary A that breaks LPN(n, m, ρ) with advantage 2 8k 2 .
Proof Sketch. The hardness of eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, χ) follows easily from eDLPN(n, m, 1, ρ, χ) by a k-step hybrid argument. Choosing F as a family of randomized functions mapping r to (z, z r), where z ← $ χ, it holds that -LPN(n, m, ρ, F) is at least as hard as LPN(n, m, ρ), as the function output z r is just one bit, i.e. we can run the reduction for both possible choices of z r. By Lemma 5, it follows that -DLPN(n, m, ρ, F) is at least as hard as -LPN(n, m, ρ, F), i.e. we have that (A, As + r, z, z r) ≈ c (A, u, z, z r),
is chosen uniformly at random, we can sample a matrix A ∈ F m×(m−n) 2 with A · A = 0 such that A is statistically close to uniform. Thus, it holds that (A , A r, z, z r) = (A , A · (As + r), z, z r) ≈ c (A , u, z, z r).
We can reformulate this to
which is the statement of eDLPN(m − n, m, 1, ρ, χ). As m − n ≥ n, any instance of eDLPN(m − n, m, 1, ρ, χ) can be truncated to an instance of eDLPN(n, m, 1, ρ, χ). We can thus establish the hardness of eDLPN(n, m, 1, ρ, χ) from LPN(n, m, ρ). The overall advantage of the LPN adversary is 2 8k 2 , if the advantage of the eDLPN adversary is .
KDM Secure Public Key Encryption from Low Noise LPN
In this section we will provide a public key encryption scheme with KDM security for affine functions based on the hardness of the low noise LPN problem. Construction 1. Let n, m, k = poly(λ) be positive integers with m > k > n. Let C be binary linear code of length k and dimension n and efficient encoding and decoding procedures C.Encode and C.Decode. The public key encrypion scheme PKE = (PKE.KeyGen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) is given by the following algorithms. The message space of PKE is F n 2 .
PKE.Dec(sk, c):
Correctness
We will first show that the scheme PKE is correct.
Lemma 7. Assume that C.Decode can efficiently decode from ρ = 4ρ 2 km errors. Then the scheme PKE is correct.
The condition of Lemma 7 can be met by choosing m, k = Ω(n) and ρ = O(1/ √ n). Thus, to obtain conjectured 2 λ -hardness for LPN, we can take usual parameter choices of m, n, k = Θ(λ 2 ) and ρ = Θ(1/λ) (as in [6, 21, 33] 
ρm . Also by a Chernoff bound and a union bound, it holds that R 0 ≤ 2ρk, except with negligible probability m · e ρk . Therefore,
2 km, except with negligible probability over the choice of e and R. Consequently, C.Decode will be able to decode m from z.
KDM-CPA security
We will now prove KDM-CPA security of PKE.
Theorem 1. Let λ be a security parameter and n, m, k, l = poly(λ) with m ≥ 2n and l ≥ 1.
} be a family of affine functions. If eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, Ber(m, ρ)), DLPN(n, l · m, ρ) and DDLPN(n, m, k, ρ) are hard, then the scheme PKE is KDM-CPA F ,l secure. More precisely, assume that A is a PPT adversary that breaks the KDM-CPA F ,l security of PKE with advantage Adv KDM-CPA (A) and queries its KDM oracle at most q = poly(λ) times. Then there exist PPT distinguishers D 1 and D 2 against the problem eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, Ber(m, ρ)), D 3 against DLPN(n, l · m, ρ) and D 4 against DDLPN(n, m, k, ρ) such that 
By Lemma 6 there exists a PPT adversary A 1 against LPN(n, m, ρ) (and thus also against LPN(n, l· m, ρ)) such that
By the same argument, there exists a PPT adversary A 2 against LPN(n, m, ρ) (and thus also against LPN(n, l · m, ρ)) such that
By Lemma 1 there exists a PPT adversary A 3 against LPN(n, l · m, ρ) such that
Finally, by Lemma 3 there exists an adversary A 4 against LPN(n, m, ρ) (and thus also against LPN(n, l · m, ρ)) such that
Now, define the adversary A * as follows. On input (A, y) A * runs the algorithms A 1 , A 2 , A 3 and A 4 on input (A, y) in parallel, checks the results of all of them (i.e. checks for each candidate solution s whether y − As ≈ ρlm) and outputs a solution if one has been found. Clearly, it holds that
as A * 's advantage in solving LPN(n, l · m, ρ) is at least as big as the advantage of the best A i (for a given λ). We claim that
To see this, note that for every λ ∈ N at least one of the following must be true
If this was not the case, then it would hold that
which contradicts inequality (1). Therefore, the advantage of A * is at least
which concludes the proof.
We will now provide the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let A be a KDM-CPA adversary against PKE. Consider the following sequence of hybrid games. For notational convenience we assume that the oracles have access to all local variables of the games (without explicitly specifying so). We will first provide an overview of game 1 -8 on the next pages.
Game 7
For i = 1, . . . , l
Game 8
For
• Game 1 is identical to the KDM-CPA experiment, we only replace PKE.KeyGen and PKE.Enc with their instantiations according to PKE.
• In game 2, we change the experiment in three ways. First, the public and secret keys are computed from a master secret s. More specifically, we first choose s ← $ F n 2 uniformly at random and then compute y i ← A i s+e i for each index i. We obtain the public and secret keys by rerandomizing s and y i correlated way. Specifically, we set s i = s + s i and y i = y i + A i s i for a uniformly random and independent s i . Since s i is uniformly random and independent of s and further
we have that the (pk i , sk i ) are identically distributed to game 1. Thus, this modification to the experiment did not introduce any statistically difference. Secondly, we write C.Encode(·) using the generator matrix G of C, which is also merely a syntactical change.
The third modification consists in changing the way the functions f the encryption oracle is queried with are evaluated. Since each f is restricted to be an affine function, we can write it as
and t ∈ F n 2 . Using that s i = s + s i we can write
T i s i + t we can write f ({sk i }) = T f s + t f . Thus, also the third modification does not introduce any statistical difference.
• In game 3 we change the way c 2 is computed. However, plugging in y j = A j s j + e j = A j (s + s j ) + e j and rearranging terms yields
• In game 4, at every call to O KDM the value C 1 is chosen uniformly at random instead of computed by C 1 ← RA j . We can show that game 3 and game 4 are computationally indistinguishable, given that the problem eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, Ber(m, ρ)) is hard. The reduction loses a factor if lq.
• In game 5 we compute C 1 by C 1 ← U − GT f . Since U is chosen independently and uniformly at random, game 4 and game 5 are identically distributed from the view of A.
• In game 6 we replace U again by RA j . We can show that game 5 and game 6 are computationally indistinguishable provided that the problem eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, Ber(m, ρ)) is hard. The reduction loses a factor if lq.
• In game 7 we choose the y i uniformly at random instead of by y i ← A i s + e i . We can show that game 6 and game 7 are computationally indistinguishable, given that DLPN(n, l · m, ρ) is hard. This reduction is tight.
• In game 8 the values C 1 and c 2 are chosen uniformly at random. Therefore the output of O KDM is independent of the challenge bit b and consequently A's advantage in game 8 is 0. We can show that game 7 and game 8 are computationally indistinguishable given that DDLPN(n, m, k, ρ) is hard. This reduction loses a factor of lq.
We will now show that game 3 and game 4 are computationally indistinguishable, given that eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, Ber(m, ρ)) is hard. Assume that
for some 1 . Assume further that A makes at most q = poly(λ) queries to its KDM oracle for each j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. We will construct a PPT distinguisher D 1 which distinguishes eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, S(m, ρ)) with advantage 1 /(q · l). The distinguisher D 1 is given as follows.
Return c D 1 does the following. It first chooses two indices j * ← $ {1, . . . , l} and d * ← $ {1, . . . , q} uniformly at random. To compute the public key pk j * , it uses the A and e taken from its own input. For all keys with index j < j * , it simulates queries to the KDM oracle like game 4. For all keys with index j > j * it simulates queries to the KDM oracle like game 3. For the key with index j, it keeps a counter d. As long as d < d * it simulates queries to the KDM oracle like game 4, if d > d * they are simulated as in game 3. However, if j = j * and d = d * it embeds C and z from its own input into the KDM query.
First observe that A j * and e * j have the same distribution as in game 3 and game 4, as A is chosen uniformly from F m×n 2 and e is chosen from Ber(m, ρ). Assume now that D 1 's input is distributed according to (A, U, e, Re). Then it holds for j = j * and d = d * that
Thus, D 1 answers the d * -th query for the key with index j * exactly like game 4. On the other hand, if D 1 's input is distributed according to (A, RA, e, Re), then it holds for j = j * and d = d * that
Consequently, D 1 answers the d * -th query for the key with index j * exactly like game 3. A standard calculation for this type of hybrid argument now shows that
i.e. D 1 distinguishes eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, Ber(m, ρ)) with advantage 1 lq .
Next we will show that game 5 and game 6 are computationally indistinguishable, given that eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, Ber(m, ρ)) is hard. This proof is basically the same as the proof of indistinguishability of game 3 and game 4. Assume that A distinguishes game 5 and game 6 with advantage 2 
Assume further that for each index j ∈ {1, . . . , l} A makes at mostueries to the KDM oracle. We will construct a distinguisher D 2 that distinguishes eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, Ber(m, ρ)) with advantage 2 /(l · q). The distinguisher D 2 is given as follows.
Again, notice that all oracle queries with j < j * or j = j * and d < d * are handled by D 2 as in game 6, while all queries with j > j * or j = j * and d > d * are handled as in game 5. Also, the distinguisher's own challenge is embedded at the query with j = j * and d = d * . If D 2 's input is of the form (A, RA, e, Re), then this query is answered as in game 6. On the other hand, if D 2 's input is of the form (A, U, e, Re), then the query is answered as in game 5. Again, a standard computation shows that
i.e. D 2 distinguishes eDLPN(n, m, k, ρ, Ber(m, ρ)) with advantage 2 lq . We will now turn to the indistinguishability of game 6 and game 7. Assume again that A distinguishes between game 6 and game 7 with advantage 3 , i.e.
We will construct a distinguisher D 3 which distinguishes DLPN(n, lm, ρ) with advantage 3 . For notational convenience, we assume that A has access to an LPN sample oracle O LPN which can be queried l times and outputs chunks of m samples at each query, i.e. at each query O LPN outputs a matrix A ∈ F m×n 2 and a vector y ∈ F m 2 . D 3 is given as follows.
Has access to LPN sample oracle
The construction of D 3 is actually quite simple. Instead of generating the A i and y i by itself, it queries the LPN sample oracle for these values. Now, it is easy to see that if D 3 is connected to an oracle that outputs samples of the form (A, As + e), then the view of A in D 3 's simulation is the same as in game 6. On the other hand, if the LPN sample oracle outputs samples of the form (A, u ), then A's view in D 3 's simulation is the same as in game 7. Consequently,
which contradicts the hardness of DLPN(n, lm, ρ).
Finally, we will turn to the indistinguishability of game 7 and game 8. Assume that A distinguishes between game 7 and game 8 with non-negligible advantage 4 , i.e.
Assume once more that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , l} the adversary A makes at mostueries to the KDM oracle with index j. We will now construct a distinguisher D 4 that distinguishes DDLPN(n, m, k, ρ) with advantage 4 /(q · l).
D 4 does the following. Let (A, C, a, c) be D 4 's input. It chooses challenge indices j * and d * uniformly at random. For i = j * , it sets A i = A and y i = a. Observe that both A i and y i have the same distribution as in both game 7 and game 8. For j < j * or j = j * and d < d * D 4 simulates queries to the KDM oracle as in game 8 and for j > j * or j = j * and d > d * as in game 7. Its own challenge is again embedded at j = j * and d = d * . Assume that D 4 's input (A, C, a, c) is of the form (A, RA, a, Ra). Then it holds that and u ← $ F k 2 . Thus it holds that
as U and u are uniformly random. Consequently, C 1 and c 2 are as in game 6. Again a simple hybrid argument shows that
which contradicts the hardness of DDLPN(n, m, k, ρ).
We will now turn to assembling the quantitative statement of the theorem. By the triangle inequality it holds that
This concludes the proof.
LPN Sample Amplification
In this Section, we will show that the hardness of LPN with a bounded number of samples implies the hardness of LPN with an unbounded number of samples, if one is willing to accept an increase in the amount of noise. Recall that S(2n, ρ) is the uniform distribution on vectors of weight ρ2n in F n 2 .
Theorem 2. Let λ be a security parameter, n = poly(λ) be a positive integer and ρ = ρ(λ)
If eDLPN(n, 2n, 1, ρ, S(2n, ρ)), DLPN(n, 2n, S(2n, ρ)) and DDLPN(n, 2n, 1, ρ) are hard, then it holds that DLPN(n, ρ ) is also hard. Precisely, if D is a PPT distinguisher against DLPN(n, ρ ) that makes at mostueries to its LPN oracle, then there exist PPT distinguishers D 1 against the problem eDLPN(n, 2n, 1, ρ, S(2n, ρ)), D 2 against DLPN(n, 2n, S(2n, ρ)) and
Corollary 9. Let n, ρ and ρ be as in Theorem 2. If LPN(n, 2n, ρ) is hard, then DLPN(n, ρ ) is also hard. More precisely, if D is a PPT distinguisher which distinguishes DLPN(n, ρ ) with advantage and makes at mostueries to its LPN oracle, then there exists a PPT adversary A * which breaks LPN(n, 2n, ρ) with advantage
Proof of Corollary 9. Let = Adv DLPN (D). By theorem 2 there exist PPT distinguishers D 1 against eDLPN(n, 2n, 1, ρ, S(2n, ρ)), D 2 against DLPN(n, 2n, S(2n, ρ)) and D 3 against DDLPN(n, 2n, 1, ρ) such that
By Lemma 6 there exists a PPT adversary A 1 that solves LPN(n, 2n, ρ) with advantage
By Corollary 2 there exists a PPT adversary A 2 that solves LPN(n, 2n, ρ) with advantage
for some γ = o(1). Finally, by Lemma 3 there exists a PPT adversary A 3 that solves LPN(n, 2n, ρ) with advantage
We now define the adversary A * . On input (A, y) A * runs the algorithms A 1 , A 2 and A 3 on input (A, y) in parallel, checks the results of all of them (i.e. checks for each candidate solution s whether y − As ≈ ρ2n) and outputs a solution if one has been found. Clearly, it holds that
as A * 's advantage in solving LPN(n, 2n, ρ) is at least as big as the advantage of the best A i (for a given λ). We claim that
which contradicts inequality (2) . Therefore, the advantage of A * is at least (1)) and the solution of LPN(n, ρ ) is not even information-theoretically defined for less then n queries, we can safely assume that q 2 ≥ 4πnρ(1 − ρ)/(1 − γ) and therefore
Corollary 9 can be seen as a trade-off between noise and extra samples. We tolerate that the amount of noise required gets squared, while in turn we get an arbitrary polynomial amount of samples.
Proof of Theorem 2. We will prove the theorem for the minimal ρ , i.e. ρ = 
Assume further that q = poly(λ) is an upper bound on the number of samples D queries. We will construct a PPT distinguisher D 1 that distinguishes the problem eDLPN(n, 2n, 1, ρ, S(2n, ρ)) with advantage ≥ 1 /q. The distinguisher D 1 is given on the left side of Figure 2 .
Notice that D 1 answers the first i * − 1 oracle queries of D exactly like Exp 1 , while it answers the last q − i * queries like Exp 2 . In the i * -th query however, D 1 embeds its own challenge. Moreover, notice that D 1 is efficient as D is efficient. To analyze the distinguishing advantage of D 1 , we will define a sequence of hybrid experiments H 0 , . . . , H q . H i is crafted to answer the first i queries like Exp 1 , while it answers the last q − i queries like Exp 2 . Experiment H i is given on the right side of Figure 2 . We are now ready to analyze the distinguishing advantage of D 1 . First assume that D 1 's input is of the form (A, e A, z, e z = z, e ). Observe that since z has weight ρm and e is distributed according to Ber(m, ρ) it holds that z, e is distributed according to Ber(ρ ). Fix the random choice i * = i. Then the sample oracle O D 1 () implemented by D 1 behaves identical to the sample oracle of H i−1 . Consequently, it holds that Pr[D 1 (A, e A, z, e z) = 1|i
and thus, as i * is uniformly chosen from {1, . . . , q}
Next assume that D 1 's input is of the form (A, u, z, e z). Again, fix the random choice of i * to i * = i. Then the sample oracle O D 1 () implemented by D 1 behaves identical to the sample oracle of H i , as z, e is distributed according to Ber(ρ ). Consequently,
and thus
Together, this yields
Thus, D 1 distinguishes eDLPN(n, 2n, 1, ρ, S(2n, ρ)) with advantage 1 /q. Next, we turn to the indistinguishability of Exp 2 and Exp 3 . Assume towards contradiction that D distinguishes between Exp 2 and Exp 3 with advantage 2 , i.e.
We will construct a PPT distinguisher D 2 against DLPN(n, 2n, S(2n, ρ). D 2 is given as follows.
Return (a, y)
The distinguisher D 2 is efficient, as D is efficient. First, assume that D 2 's input is of the form (A, As + z), where s is chosen uniformly from F n 2 and z is chosen from S(2n, ρ). DLPN(n, 2n, S(2n, ρ) ) is 2 .
We Assume further D makes at most q = poly(λ) queries to its sample oracle. We will construct a PPT distinguisher D 3 that distinguishes DDLPN(n, 2n, 1, ρ) with advantage 3 /q. The distinguisher D 3 is given on the left side of This concludes the proof.
Conclusion
In this work we have constructed the first public key encryption scheme with KDM-CPA security for affine function from the low-noise LPN assumption. Moreover, we have provided a novel connection between LPN with a bounded number of samples and LPN with an unbounded number of samples. Both results have analogues inn the LWE realm (The KDM-CPA secure scheme of Applebaum et al. [10] and the LWE random self-reduction of Gentry et al. [26] ). Both our results follow the same blueprint as their LWE counterparts, however, while in the LWE realm powerful statistical tools such as gaussian regularity [26] and the leftover-hash lemma [31, 19] are available, no comparable statistical techniques are available in the LPN realm. Instead, our approach, following Kiltz et al. [33] was to substitute these techniques with computational counterparts based on LPN. Specifically, the leaky LPN problem, and as a special case the extended LPN problem turned out to be very useful in filling this gap. A natural future direction of work would be to try to lift further results from the LWE/SIS realm into the LPN realm, such as identity based encryption [17, 3, 4, 7] or efficient and compact signature schemes [14, 22, 23] .
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